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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs . 
JGLAYNE FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 970508-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting Fisher's out-of-court statements under an 
"unavailability" theory? This Court must determine whether 
admission of Fisher's statements "impinged on the values embodied 
in the Confrontation Clause to such a degree as to rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation." State v. Menziesr 889 P.2d 
393, 402 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995) (citing 
State v. Webbr 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989) (separate opinion 
of Zimmerman, J.)). 
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This issue was preserved at trial (Tr. 1-26). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
AMENDMENT VI, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
RULE 803, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness...: 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant 
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event 
or condition. 
RULE 804, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a 
witness" includes situations in which the defendant....: 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent 
of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure 
the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness....: 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
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which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will be best served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing to provide 
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jolayne Fairbanks appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
order of Probation by the Honorable John C. Backlund on July 16, 
1997, after a trial at which Fairbanks was convicted of Assault, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of American Fork City 
Ordinance 76-5-102. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Fairbanks was charged by information filed on or about 
January 3, 1997, with Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of American Fork City Ordinance 76-5-102 (R. 3) . 
On April 25, 1997, a trial was conducted before Judge 
Backlund at the close of which Fairbanks was found guilty of 
Assault (R. 12-13). On July 16, 1997, Fairbanks was sentenced 
and placed on court probation for a period of twelve months (R. 
18, 20-21). 
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On August 1, 1997, Fairbankds filed a Notice of Appeal with 
the Fourth District Court and this action followed (R. 23). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Fairbanks was charged with assaulting Kan Fisher on 
December 23, 1996. At trial, conducted on April 25, 1997, Fisher 
was not present. 
Andrew Hale, a patrol sergeant with the American Fork Police 
Department, testified that at approximately 10:30 a.m. on 
December 23, 1996, he received a report of a fight at 187 East 
400 South in American Fork (Tr. at 4). Hale responded to that 
location where he met with two females, Kan Fisher and Jolayne 
Fairbanks (Id.). Fisher was crying (Id.). Hale testified that 
he "tried to talk to them to see what happened" (Tr. at 4). 
At this point in the tnaL, Hale sought to testify as to 
Fisher's statements, to which Fairbanks objected (Tr. at 5). 
Fairbanks was subpoenaed by the City, but failed to appear at 
Fairbanks' trial (Tr. at 5). The City then sought introduction 
of Fisher's statements to Hale under the theory that Fisher was 
either "unavailable" or that her statements qualified as "excited 
utterances" (Tr. at 5-6). Fairbanks again objected claiming: 
one, that there was insufficient foundation at this point to 
determine whether the statements qualified as "excited 
utterances"; and two, that the defendant had a right to 
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confrontation which impacted the issue of "unavailability" (Tr. 
at 7-9). 
The trial court overruled Fairbanks' objections and allowed 
the introduction of Fisher's statements because she was 
unavailable (the City had been unable to procure her appearance 
by subpoena); and also under the excitec utterance exception (Tr. 
at 9) . 
Hale testified that Fisher told him that she and Fairbanks 
"were in the process of separating, and that Fairbanks was 
supposed to have moved out" but had returned that morning (Tr. at 
10). Hale testified that Fisher told him that "she was sitting 
on the toilet in the bathroom when Fairbanks came in and grabbed 
her by the hair and punched her in the face" (Id.). Fisher also 
told Hale that she hit Fairbanks back and then left the house and 
went to her sister's house to call the police (Id.). Hale also 
testified that Fisher had a laceration on the side of her nose 
(Id.). 
Hale testified that Fairbanks told him that "they had had a 
fight" but that she had not hit Fisher (Tr. at 10). Hales 
testified that Fairbanks also told him that Fisher must have 
received the cut on her nose "when she was defending herself from 
Fisher" (Id.). Hale testified that he saw no signs of injury on 
Fairbanks (Tr. at 11). 
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On cross-examination, Hale testified that the fight occurred 
at "9:30 of 10" a.m. because "Fisher had to have time to drive to 
her sister's home and her sister called the police. Then I drove 
back to her house and that's where I met them" (Tr. at 11). 
At this point the trial court revised his earlier ruling on 
the admissibility of Fisher's statements and eliminated "excited 
utterance as one of the grounds for its admissibility" (Tr. at 
13). However, the trial court still admitted the statements 
because Fisher was an "unavailable witness" (Id.). 
Marian Koginnes, Fisher's mother, testified that Fisher came 
to her house on December 23, 1996, at "9 or 10 a.m." with a 
bloody nose (Tr. at 14). After Koginnes' testimony, the City 
rested (Tr. at 15). 
Fairbanks then asked the trial court for clarification on 
his ruling of unavailability because Rule 804 (b) requires a 
finding of the nature of the testimony prior to its admission 
(Tr. at 15). The trial court then found that the statements were 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) because the statements: were 
offered as evidence of a material fact; were more probative than 
any other evidence the City could produce through reasonable 
means; and because the interests of justice would be best served 
by admission of the statements (Tr. at 16) . 
Fairbanks then argued that Rule 804(b)(5) also provides that 
evidence could not be admitted under that section unless "the 
6 
proponent: of it makes Known to tne adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to meet it" which includes the 
name and address of the declarant (Tr. at 17). The trial court 
replied that the City wouldn't have had a prior intention to use 
the statements because they coulc nor have known that Fisher 
would disregard the subpoena (Tr. at 17). The trial court 
indicated that he would grant a continuance so Fairbanks could 
subpoena Fisher to have her "here for cross-examination" (Tr. at 
18) . 
Jolayne Fairbanks, testified that on December 23, 1996, both 
she and Fisher resided at 187 East 400 South in American Fork 
(Tr. at 19). Fairbanks testified that on that day she and Fisher 
had a physical encounter (Id.). 
Fairbanks testified that the only phone at the residence was 
a cellular phone which belonged to her parents (Tr. at 20). 
Fairbanks testified that she had the phone at the residence 
because she had been ill and because her parents wanted her to 
use it if she needed their help because "Kari and I had kind of 
had conflicts and I was kind of worried about needing their 
availability to get out of the house" (Tr. at 20) . 
Fairbanks testified that prior to the altercation, Fisher 
had asked to use the phone to call a friend, but Fairbanks told 
her no because "I had promised my parents it would only be used 
for emergency, since it was in their name" (Tr. at 20). 
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Fairbanks testified that Fisher then "got really upset" and she 
began hitting Fairbanks in the back of the head while the two of 
them were in the basement bedroom (Tr. at 21). Fairbanks 
testified that she never hit Fisher (Id.). Fairbanks also 
testified that there was never an altercation in the bathroom 
area (Tr. at 21-22). Finally, Fairbanks testified that she was 
unsure how Fisher received the cut on her nose because she did 
not remember having any contact with her (Tr. at 22). 
At the close of trial, the court found Fairbanks guilty of 
assaulting Fisher (Tr. at 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront and question 
all witnesses against them. Accordingly, out-of-court statements 
of a declarant no present at trial are only admissible when the 
declarant is constitutionally unavailable and when the 
statements at issue are sufficiently reliable. In this case, the 
trial court erred both in finding Fisher to be unavailable and in 
finding her hearsay statements to be reliable. Therefore, 
Fairbanks' conviction should be reversed. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FISHER WAS 
AN "UNAVAILABLE WITNESS" AND IN ADMITTING FISHER'S 
OUT-OF-COURT STATMENTS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity to confront the 
witnesses against them. In this case, the confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment is clearly implicated by Fisher's failure 
to appear at trial and the trial court's admission of her out-of-
court statements: 
When an out-of-court statement is offered at trial for 
the truth of the matter asserted and the declarant is 
present and available for cross-examination, no federal or 
state confrontation problem is present... On the other hand, 
if the declarant is not present, the core values of the 
confrontation right are implicated because "the essence of 
the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the 
accusing witness in court and subject to cross-examination, 
so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder 
of fact." 
State v. Webbf 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989) (separate opinion of 
Zimmerman, J.) (citations omitted). In addition, "it is possible 
that admission of certain evidence could be justified under a 
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hearsay exception, yet still violate the defendant's 
constitutional right of confrontation. Xd. at 1111-1112. 
Accordingly the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980), has articulated a 
two-pronged test "for determining the admissibility of hearsay 
when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at 
trial. First, there must be a showing of ^unavailability'. Id. 
at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. Second, if the declarant is 
unavailable, the statement at issue is 'admissible only if it 
bears adequate indicia of reliability.' Id." State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 910 
(1995). Utah expressly adopted the two-prong test from Ohio v. 
Roberts in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
A. The trial court erred in finding Fisher to be a 
constitutionally "unavailable witness". 
Unavailability under the Sixth Amendment "is found only when 
it is ^practically impossible to produce the witness in court.'" 
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402 (quoting Webbr 779 P.2d at 1113 
(separate opinion of Zimmerman, J.)). "In short, every 
reasonable effort must be made to produce the witness." Id. In 
addition, the State bears the burden of "proving unavailability 
by competent evidence." State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d L232 (Utah 1990). 
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In this case z:.e only eifori nu--... •? by the City to produce 
Fisher at trial was to issue a single subpoena. This single act 
is insufficient to sustain the City's burden of "proving 
unavailability by competent evidence." The City did not 
demonstrate that it was "practically impossible to produce" 
Fisher at trial but only demonstrated that Fisher failed to 
appear. Cf. Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893-394 (State subpoenaed each 
witness three times, tried to make personal contact, placed phone 
calls and spoke with relatives in attempt to procure witnesses 
presence in court). See also, State v. Brooksf 638 P.2d 537, 540 
(Utah 1981) (Testimony of officer that he had contacted all known 
relatives, likely hangouts, local bus terminals, and out of state 
police in attempt to locate witnesses who failed to appear at 
trial) . 
Fairbanks asserts that the City did not demonstrate a "good 
faith effort" to obtain Fisher's presence at trial and that the 
trial court abused its discretion in finding Fisher to be an 
"unavailable" witness. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 539. 
B. The trial court erred in finding Fisher's out-of-court 
statments to be sufficiently reliable. 
Should this Court find that Fisher was, in fact, 
"unavailable", Fairbanks asserts that Fisher's hearsay statements 
should not have been admitted into evidence because they were not 
sufficiently reliable. The second prong of the Ohio v. Roberts 
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test holds that "the statement at issue is "admissible only if it 
bears adequate indicia of reliability.' Id." Menzies, 889 P.2d 
at 402. xx "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded at 
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.'" Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894 (quoting Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539). 
Most of the Utah cases addressing the reliability-prong of 
the Ohio v. Roberts test concern the admission of prior testimony 
from a preliminary hearing. See, Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-403; 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1982); Brooks, 638 
P.2d at 540-41. 
At issue in this case, however, are Fisher's statements to 
an investigating police officer. The trial court found that the 
statements had guarantees of trustworthiness because they were 
given to a law enforcement officer (Tr. at 16). The trial court 
also found that the interest of justice would best be served by 
admission of the statements because "certainly without [the 
statements] we're not going to have a trial today" (Id.). 
The closest case on point to the facts of this case is State 
v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1990) . In Drawn, the State sought admission of the out-of-
court statements given to law enforcement personnel by two women 
12 
arrestee with Drawn as statements made against the declarants' 
penal interest. 791 P.2d at Q93~94. This Court found no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court in admitting the statements 
because the statements were made when the witnesses were under 
arrest, the statements subjected the two women to possible 
prosecution, and because the statements were corroborative of 
each other and of other known evidence. Drawnr 791 P.2d at 894. 
In this case, however, Fisher's statements that Fairbanks 
hit her were not corroborated by other evidence nor did they 
subject her to criminal prosecution. To the contrary, Fisher's 
statements were "made in an obvious attempt to curry favor with 
the authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating" her; 
and therefore, the "lack trustworthiness". Drawn, 791 P.2d at 
894. 
Fairbanks requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
finding of "reliability" and hold that Fisher's out-of-court 
statements were erroneously admitted into evidence. 
C. The erroneous admission of Fisher's out-of-court statements 
was not "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Since the trial court's erroneous admission of Fisher's out-
of-court statements "affected the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, it can be held 
harmless only if this Court is 'able to declare a belief that it 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Chapman, 655 P.2d at 
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1124 (citations omitted). In this case, without Fisher's out-of-
court statements the evidence is wholly insufficient to support a 
conviction of Fairbanks for assault. Even with the admission of 
Fisher's statements, the evidence is at best conflicting. 
Officer Hale testified that Fisher told him that Fairbanks hit 
her (Tr. at 10), but Fairbanks testified that she never hit 
Fisher and, in fact, was hit by Fisher (Tr. at 20-22). 
Moreover, the "law is that a single uncorroborated hearsay 
statement is not substantial evidence and not sufficient to 
support a verdict." Webbr 779 P.2d at 1115 (citations omitted). 
Since Fairbanks "has been tried and since the evidence is 
wholly insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction" 
this Court should hold "that the information must be 
dismissed...." Id. Morevoer, "[d]ouble jeopardy bars the retrial 
of a defendant when an appellate court declares the evidence to 
be insufficient to sustain a conviction." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Fairbanks respectfully asks that this Court find that the 
trial court erred in admitting into evidence Fisher's out-of-
court statements: One, because the City failed to demonstrate 
that Fisher was an "unavailable" witness; and two, because 
Fisher's statements were not sufficiently reliable. Furthermore, 
because the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient as a 
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matter of law to support a conviction, Fairbanks asks that this 
Court reverse her conviction and order that the information be 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of February, 1998. 
plr^/^f/^ ' h</s?'l 
Margaret/' P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Fairbanks 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Bruce Murdock, 
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley, 306 West Main Street, American 
Fork, Utah 84003 this j day of February, 1998. 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MUNICIPAL DIVISION AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs Case No. 971000001 
JOLAYNE FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant 
Bench Trial 
Electronically recorded on 
April 25, 1997 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the City: 
For the Defendant: 
BRUCE MURDOCK 
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
THOMAS MEANS 
Aldrich/Nelson/Weight/Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P. O. BOX 1786 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
T E L E P H O N E : ( 8 0 1 ) 2 2 4 - 9 8 4 7 
W508-61 
INDEX 
WITNESS; ANDREW HALE PAGE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MURDOCH 4 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. MEANS 11 
MURDOCK 14 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MEANS 19 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. MURDOCK 22 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MEANS 23 
-oOo-
WITNESS 
DIRECT 
WITNESS 
: MARIAN KOGINNES 
EXAMINATION BY: MR. 
: JOLAYNE FAIRBANKS 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on April 25, 1997) 
THE COURT: We'll call the matter of the City of 
American Fork versus Jolayne Fairbanks. This is the trial 
in this case. Mr. Murdock represents the City. Mr. Means 
represents the defendant who is present. 
Is the City ready to proceed? 
MR. MURDOCK: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is the defendant ready to proceed? 
MR. MEANS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may call your first 
witness. 
MR. MURDOCK: City calls Officer Andy Hale. 
THE COURT: If you'd come up, Officer Hale, and 
take the oath. 
you're 
Court 
truth, 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony 
about to give in the case now pending before this 
is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. 
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ANDREW HALE, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MURDOCH: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. Andrew Hale. I'm a patrol sergeant with American 
Fork Police. 
Q. Were you so employed and on duty December 23rd of 
1996? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. At approximately 10:30 a.m. that day did you 
receive a report of a fight at 187 East 400 South in 
American Fork City? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you respond to that location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Upon responding what did you find? 
A. There was two adult females over at the house, 
Kari Koginnes -- or Kari Fisher and Jolayne Fairbanks. 
One of the parties, Kari Fisher was very emotional, was 
crying. I tried to — I was the only one there but I 
tried to separate them the best I could and tried to 
talk to them each to see what happened. 
Q. Did you speak to Kari Fisher? 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did she tell you? 
MR. MEANS: Objection. 
THE COURT: Mr. Murdock, has she been subpoenaed? 
MR. MURDOCK: She's been subpoenaed, your Honor. 
She's not shown up. Apparently her statements would also 
come in under the excited utterance exception. 
THE COURT: She would be an unavailable witness, 
wouldn't she, if she's been subpoenaed and failed to obey 
the subpoena and be here today? 
MR. MURDOCK: Your Honor, can I respond to that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MURDOCK: First on the issue of unavailability 
this would be the first time that I've faced this attempt 
to get this statement. I wasn't aware that this was going 
to occur. So I'm going to have to speak from my feet 
without researching it, but my impression of unavailable 
with respect to — first of all, I should say defendant 
has the right to confront witnesses, as the Constitution 
of both our state and the United States. 
We're talking about an exception to the hearsay 
rule, not an exception to the right to confrontation. 
While something might qualify as an exception to the 
hearsay rule, it takes a stronger standard, a much higher 
standard to qualify for an exception to the Constitutional 
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right to confront, 
I believe that the standard of unavailability to 
the Constitution is almost an impossibility to get the 
defendant here. Not a service and that she just doesn't 
show, but I would contribute it to death, to moving out of 
the country, and not just her unwillingness. 
I think that the City would have to show you a 
much higher standard and effort to get her here. I think 
the proper relief in this case would be to have sought an 
order of contempt for her nonappearance. I don't think it 
rises to the level of foundation. 
THE COURT: How's the City going to know if she 
isn't going to be here until the trial occurs and she 
doesn't show? 
MR. MURDOCH: Well, that's true, but I think that 
the City's relief at that point is to advise you that 
she's not here and then seek a continuance and an order to 
appear upon an order to show cause for the Court to 
continue. 
THE COURT: Well, on the second basis the City is 
seeking to admit the statement as an excited utterance. 
That she was under the impact of some situation that 
just occurred and was quite emotional. Therefore it's 
admissible under the excited utterance exception. 
MR. MURDOCK: Correct, your Honor. 
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MR. MEANS: May I respond to that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MEANS: Will you give me a moment to read the 
rule? 
THE COURT: Yes. While you're doing this let me 
inquire, does Kari Fisher live with Jolayne Fairbanks 
still? They do not live together? Okay. 
Mr. Means, do you need some more time? 
MR. MEANS: No, I can respond now, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. MEANS: The rule on excited utterance, as you 
know, is Rule 803(2) and it states verbatim, "A statement 
relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of the excitement caused by 
the event or condition." 
Assuming that -- I haven't heard that foundation 
yet, the fact of when the statement was made or how soon 
after the event or while in the throws of the emotional 
strain of the event, but I think assuming that the officer 
has not given us that foundation, I think the continuum of 
that is that excited utterances are made while things are 
going on to the point that people cannot reflect on what 
they're saying — or don't reflect on what they're saying. 
It just comes out. It's taken for its reliability for 
that reason alone. 
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if the capacity of the rime is no longer -- tne 
person -- and the person is no longer in that excited 
state, maybe upset but not in that excited state, there's 
a chance for fabrication or reflection or whatever. 
Secondly I'd like to rcake a point for the record 
that this particular section says that the unavailability 
or the availability of a declarant is immaterial, but for 
purposes of the Constitutional rights the defendant has, 
unavailability of the witness is important. Under the 
hearsay rule a declarant is determined unavailable — and 
it gives some examples. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MEANS: Like the person is exempt, like a 
privilege, which we don't have here, I don't believe. 
Persistently refusing to testify. 
THE COURT: Don't have that. 
MR. MEANS: Don't have that. Testifies to a lack 
of memory. She's not here to tell us that. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. MEANS: Is unable to attend or be present or 
testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity. There's no 
foundation of that. 
THE COURT: We don't know that. Right. 
MR. MEANS: Is absent from the hearing and a 
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proponent of the State has been unable to procure the 
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
THE COURT: We do have that. 
MR. MEANS: We have one shot at it. 
THE COURT: Process. They've served her with a 
summons or a subpoena. 
MR. MEANS: And my argument would be that for 
purposes of the hearsay if they're going to comply, I 
don't believe that unavailability -- again, this comes to 
me fresh and I haven't briefed it. I don't believe that 
it rises to the level of unavailability for purposes of 
the Constitution. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
I'm going to overrule the objection and make a 
finding that the statement may come in under Rule 804(5), 
finding that the defendant is absent from the hearing, 
and the proponent of the statement, which is the City, 
has been unable to procure her appearance by service of 
process, which was a subpoena. 
Court feels that it also can come in under the 
excited utterance exception. The officer has testified 
that when he arrived there were two adult females. Kari 
Fisher was very emotional and crying to anybody that's 
speaking to her. It's almost like the classic excited 
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utterance situation. So you may proceed. 
Q. BY MR. MURD0CK: At that time, Officer Hale, what 
did Kari Fisher tell you had jusu happened? 
A. She told me they were in the process of — that 
she and Ms. Fairbanks were in the process of separating, 
and that Fairbanks was supposed to have moved out. Had 
returned that morning. 
Fisher said that she was sitting on the toilet in 
the bathroom when Fairbanks came in and grabbed her by the 
hair and punched her in the face. Fisher said that she 
did -- at that point she did hit her back and then left 
the house to go -- apparently they didn't have a phone 
available -- and went to her sister's home to call the 
police. It was actually her sister that called. 
Q. Did you look at Kari Fisher and observe any 
physical signs of a fight? 
A. Yes, she had a laceration on the side of her nose 
that appeared to be very fresh. 
Q. Did you speak to the defendant Jolayne Fairbanks? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did she tell you? 
A. She said that they had had a fight. She said 
that she didn't hit Fisher. I asked her how Fisher got 
the cut on her nose and she said that it must have been 
when she was defending herself from Fisher. 
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Q. Did you see any signs of injury on Jolayne 
Fairbanks? 
A. No, I did not. 
MR. MURDOCK: No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may cross examine, 
Mr. Means. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MEANS: 
Q. Officer, what time did you take this report? 
A. I show it was reported at 10:30 a.m. 
Q. Do you know what time the occurrence occurred? 
A. They indicated to me that it was approximately 
9:30 or 10. Ms. Fisher had to have time to drive to her 
sister's home and her sister called the police. Then I 
then drove back to her house and that's where I met them. 
Q. Where is the sight of the alleged assault? 
What's the address? 
A. 187 East 400 South, American Fork. 
Q. What's the address of Ms. Fisher's mother's 
house? 
A. I don't know the precise address. It's a county 
address just south of there probably a mile. 
Q. A mile in distance. Your testimony is that 
Ms. Fisher had drove to her mother's house to make a 
report. 
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A. It was her sister that called. She may have been 
at her mother's house where she called from, 
Q. I said that. It was my mistake. She drove to 
her sister's house. 
A. Well, I guess I made that assumption. It was her 
sister that called me, Tammy Koginnes. 
Q. You originally got a call from Tammy Koginnes. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then responded to the Fisher residence. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did Ms. Fisher tell you that she had driven to 
the Koginnes residence to make the report? 
A. That's I belicive what she told me, that she had 
driven there to — and her sister called for her. 
Q. That's because they didn't have a phone available 
at the Fisher house? 
A. Correct. 
Q. She then drove back to the Fisher house and met 
you there to talk with you personally. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And your testimony is is that she told you the 
assault took place at 9:30 and you spoke with her at 
10:30. 
A. Correct. 
MR. MEANS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
12 
THE COURT: Okay. Given that, then, I'm going to 
revise my ruling on the admissibility of the statement and 
eliminate excited utterance as one of the grounds for its 
admissibility. I think there was such a sufficient lapse 
of time and intervening actions that that's not a basis 
to admit the statement, but it still comes in under the 
unavailable witness. 
Redirect, do you have any questions? 
MR. MURDOCK: No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can step down, Officer Hale. 
Thank you. 
Does the City rest? 
MR. MURDOCK: City would call Marian Koginnes, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you come up, ma'am. Please 
raise your right hand. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you're about to give in the case now pending 
before this Court is the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Please be seated on the stand. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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MARIAN KOGINNES, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MURDOCK: 
Q. Would you please state your name for the record. 
A. Marian Koginnes. I'm Kari Fisher's mother. 
Q. And what's your address? 
A. 5550 West 6400 North. 
Q. Were you present at that address on December 23rd 
of 1996? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And sometime in the morning of that date at 9 or 
10 a.m. did your daughter Kari Fisher come to your house? 
A. Yes, she did. She was very excited, emotional. 
She had blood coming out of her nose and I tried to wipe 
it. Her hair was sticking up. We asked her what happened 
and she said, "Call the cops. Tammy, call the cops." 
THE COURT: Wait just a minute, please. Before 
you say what she said, I/ll strike the statement as to 
what Kari said. 
MR. MURDOCK: I don't think I have any more 
questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Means. 
MR. MEANS: I have no questions of this witness, 
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your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can step down, Ms. Koginnes. 
Thank you. 
MR. MURDOCK: The City rests. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Means. 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, before we proceed, could I 
make one other observation? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. MEANS: Evidentiary in nature. We found 
that the defendant or the declarant has not been -- has 
probably -- let me rephrase that. Strike it. While you 
found that the declarant is unavailable, I believe that's 
one step to have found her unavailable, but we need to 
also find that the nature of the testimony is either 
former testimony, a statement of a belief in impending 
death, a statement against interest, a statement of 
personal family history or some other exception which 
qualifies under the rule, in addition to her just being 
unavailable. 
THE COURT: Let me look at that. I'm not familiar 
with that, I guess. Where does it say that? That that 
has to be part of the finding? 
MR. MEANS: In Rule 804, your Honor, it talks 
about when a witness is unavailable. I believe it says 
that -- let me find it. 
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THE COURT: I've got the rule right in front of 
me, but — 
MR. MEANS: Yes. Under Rule B it says, "Hearsay 
exceptions: The following are not excluded by hearsay rule 
if a declarant is unavailable as a witness," and it lists 
the following types of prior statements. 
I believe we'd need therefore to find that she's 
unavailable, number one, and then number two, find that 
the nature of her statement is one of the following. 
804-B. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain I agree with 
the argument that that's how that rule works, but I'm 
going to make a finding that it does qualify under the 
other exceptions portion of the rule. That it was made 
under circumstances that would guarantee trustworthiness. 
She was giving a statement to a law enforcement officer. 
The Court also finds that the statement was 
offered as evidence of a material fact, and that the 
statement is certainly probative on the point for which 
it is offered, and other evidence that the City could 
procure through reasonable means. 
Also that the general purposes of the rule is the 
interest of justice would best be served by the admission 
of the statement into evidence. Certainly without that 
we're not going to have a trial today. The only thing 
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would be that Officer Hale could testify to her physical 
condition at the time. It just appears to me that the 
condition surrounding the statement and the other physical 
evidence are sufficient to allow it to be received today. 
MR. MEANS: Can I make just a bit of a further 
record, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. MEANS: I believe that if it falls under that 
exception, that the final paragraph of that rule says 
that, "However, a statement --" and this is for other 
exceptions. "However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to meet it. Proponents intentions offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name, 
address of the declarant." 
I've had a police report before, and it did have 
the content of the statement. Probably in that police 
report it had a name and address of the declarant, but 
I didn't have any prior notice that it was going to be 
offered under this section. 
THE COURT: Well, and the City wouldn't have known 
that because she didn't obey the subpoena. I mean, that's 
the very reason why we have the rule if they've served 
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process on somebody and they don't show up. They don't 
know that until the trial starts. 
So it seems to be kind of circular reasoning in 
the rule, but I mean, if you're asking me to continue this 
case so you can subpoena Ms. Fisher and have her here for 
cross examination, I'll grant your motion. 
MR. MEANS: Well, no, I'm not making a motion to 
continue. I think it's the City's burden to bring their 
witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, they've tried that, and that's 
why I found her to be an unavailable witness. So I've 
admitted it. We've got a record on it. So we'll proceed. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: They've rested. 
MR. MURDOCK: The City's rested. 
MR. MEANS: Call the defendant, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Will you come up, ma'am, 
and raise your right hand and take the oath. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you're about to give in the case now pending 
before this Court is the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
/// 
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JOLAYNE FAIRBANKS. 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MEANS: 
Q. State your name for the record, please. 
A. Jolayne Fairbanks. 
Q. Are you the defendant in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have a memory of the events of the 23rd of 
December of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just prior to Christmas last year. 
A. Right. 
Q. Were you residing on that day at 187 East 400 
South in American Fork? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know Kari Fisher? 
A . I do. 
Q. Did she also reside at that address? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have a physical encounter or an 
altercation with her on that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to that -- let me ask you some background. 
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Did you have a phone at that residence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the type of phone? 
A• Cellular. 
Q. Where did the phone come from? 
A. My parents. 
Q. Was the bill in your parents' name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you have possession of the phone? 
A. I had been ill, and they wanted me to use it 
if I needed their help, and Kari and I had kind of had 
conflicts and I was kind of worried about needing their 
availability to get out of the house, 
Q. Was there another phone in the house? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you and Kari have any discussions prior to an 
altercation about the use of the phone? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What was it about? 
A. She asked me if she could use the phone to call 
a friend, and I told her no because I had promised my 
parents it would only be used for emergency, since it was 
in their name. 
Q. How did she react to that response from you? 
A. That's when she got really upset. 
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Q. Did she do anything physically? 
A. Yes• 
Q. What? 
A. She was hitting me in the back of the head right 
back through here. 
Q. She struck you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What room were you in when this occurred? 
A. In the basement bedroom, 
Q. Did you respond to her hitting you? 
A. No. You mean, did I hit her? No. 
Q. Well, that could be one way of responding. Did 
you do that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you do anything else in response? 
A. I told her to stop. 
Q. Did you cover up? Do you understand what I mean 
by that? 
A. Yeah. I mean, I was holding my hands behind my 
head trying to --
Q. You didn't strike her at all? 
A. No. 
Q. Did the altercation ever move into the bathroom 
area? 
A. No 
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Q• Did you approach Kari in the bathroom area and 
strike her afterwards? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there ever an altercation of any type in the 
bathroom area? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any idea how she received the cut 
that the officer had observed? 
A. I don't, unless -- I don't know — when I was 
trying to ward her off or whatever, I don't know, but I 
don't remember ever having contact with her. 
MR. MEANS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Means. 
Mr. Murdock. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MURDOCK: 
Q. Isn't it fair to say that when someone gets a cut 
on their nose that that could be caused by being struck by 
a fist or a hand or something like that? 
A. Is that fair to say? 
Q. Pretty much consistent. 
A. Not always. 
Q. Can it happen? 
A. It can happen, I'm sure. 
Q. But your testimony is that you never touched Kari 
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Fisher during that altercation. 
A. No, not that I'm aware of. I didn't touch her. 
Q. So this cut that was fresh when officer arrived 
just kind of happened. 
A. I guess. I don't know how it happened. 
MR. MURDOCK: No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Means. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MEANS: 
Q. In this incident we're talking about that you're 
testifying to, did this incident, did it occur on the 
morning of that day? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MEANS: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can step down, ma'am. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Does the defense have any other 
witnesses? 
MR. MEANS: No, your Honor. We'd rest. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll listen to any 
argument, then, that Counsel wish to submit to the Court 
before rendering a verdict. 
MR. MURDOCK: Go ahead. 
MR. MEANS: Judge, the only live witness, if you 
understand what I mean, to the occurrences that day, 
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testified that Jolayne Fairbanks didn /t assault Kari 
Fisher. 
Weighed against the hearsay evidence that was 
admitted then you have a conflict, but I'd hope the Court 
would put more faith for weight into that testimony of a 
person who was here subject to cross examination, subject 
to probing by both sides. Bearing in mind that the other 
party's statement came in through a third party. There 
was no opportunity to probe that statement, to ask 
questions if she might be mistaken, to try to challenge 
that statement. I'd hope that the Court would find 
Ms. Fisher -- I'm sorry -- Ms. Fairbanks not guilty. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Murdock. 
MR. MURDOCK: Your Honor, the hearsay testimony 
that came in was consistent with the facts that were 
testified to by the personal observations of the witnesses 
that testified. The disheveled hair of the victim 
testified to by the mother, the cut on her nose testified 
to by both witnesses, consistent with someone being 
punched in the nose, which is what the statement had 
indicated. So in that sense I'd say it's a reliable 
statement. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'm going to find the 
defendant guilty of assault. Ma'am, you have the right to 
return for sentencing after 2 days and within 45 days, or 
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you can waive that time and be sentenced today. 
What would you prefer to do, Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, she would prefer to 
postpone sentencing. 
THE COURT: Okay, that will be fine. Do you know 
when you'll be out here next time, Mr. Means? Do you have 
any idea? 
MR. MEANS: I don't, I'm sorry, but I'm sure it's 
within a week or two at the most. 
THE COURT: This case is continued, then, for 
sentencing and the defendant is ordered to appear — I'm 
just trying to find a date when I've got your name written 
in on a case, but I think I've written the cases down but 
haven't put your name down with them. 
Let's continue this to Friday, May the 9th at 11 
o'clock for sentencing. Then if you have a problem with 
that you can contact the clerk and have it reset. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ma'am, if you'll come up, 
please, and see the clerk, she'll have you sign a promise 
to appear for the sentencing. Does either side feel it 
would be appropriate to have a no contact order between 
now and the date of sentencing? 
MR. MURDOCK: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that, 
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Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, defendant actually would 
seek a no contact order also. 
THE COURT: Okay. The Court will order that the 
defendant have no contact with the alleged victim in this 
case between now and the date of sentencing. 
MR. MEANS: Actually she's seeking a no contact 
order for Ms. Fisher. 
THE COURT: That's what I thought you were saying 
MR. MEANS: I'm not sure you have her before you. 
THE COURT: I don't. 
(Trial concluded) 
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